Enrico Mattei: Italy's economic warrior (1906- 1962)

In the wake of World War II, Italy—amid a major economic reconstruction—faced a critical challenge: securing a degree of energy independence in a market dominated by the Seven Sisters. This Anglo-American oil cartel controlled access to resources and set the prices. Lacking significant coal or hydrocarbon reserves, Italy found itself reliant on imports. When Enrico Mattei was appointed in 1945 to lead Agip (Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli), his initial mission was to dismantle the state-owned company. However, the Italian entrepreneur recognized the opportunity to establish a national enterprise in the strategically vital hydrocarbon sector.

The early days of ENI and the “Mattei Formula”

Aware of the power of public opinion, Mattei skillfully leveraged communication to rally support. He first capitalized on the discovery of the Caviaga gas field, exaggerating its potential by claiming it could cover 30 to 40% of Italy's oil needs. This strategic move reassured the authorities and helped secure funding. He also staged the discovery of oil in Cortemaggiore. Though modest, the find was presented to the public as a strategic asset. The gasoline produced from this site was marketed under the brand Supercortemaggiore, with the slogan “La potente benzina italiana” (“The powerful Italian fuel”)—a clever PR campaign that reinforced the idea of Italian energy autonomy. This sovereignty narrative allowed him to rally political support: in 1953, he persuaded the government to establish ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi), a state-owned company dedicated to hydrocarbons.

From its inception, ENI faced growing opposition. Some Italian private industrial groups decried unfair competition, arguing that ENI benefited from financial advantages tied to its public status. On the international stage, the company’s rise alarmed the Seven Sisters, who viewed the emergence of a state-backed competitor with suspicion. Obstacles mounted: limited access to international credit, increased surveillance by Western intelligence services, and smear campaigns in the financial press.

In response to the monopoly of the Seven Sisters—who imposed exploitative contracts on producing countries—Mattei developed an alternative model: the “Mattei Formula.” Breaking with the traditional 50-50 profit-sharing between Western oil firms and producing states, he offered a new deal: 75% of the profits for the producer country, and 25% for ENI. This policy immediately attracted governments eager to break free from Western influence. Egypt was the first to adopt the formula in 1955, granting ENI a lasting foothold in the country. The strategy paid off: in 1961, the first major oil discovery occurred in the Belaym concession, which would go on to play a significant role in Egypt’s petroleum production. In 1957, ENI managed to strike a deal in Iran, despite U.S. pressure. The agreement secured privileged access to Iranian hydrocarbons and opened the Iranian market to Italian industrial exports.

Beyond short-term gains, Mattei’s strategy was rooted in long-term positioning. He paired oil contracts with investments in local infrastructure and the training of technicians—notably through the Higher School of Hydrocarbon Studies, founded in 1955 in Metanopoli—thus establishing a relationship of mutual dependence with producing countries. ENI didn’t merely buy oil; it contributed to the industrial development of partner states, thereby strengthening its influence and long-term presence in the global energy market.

Third-Worldism as a business model

ENI’s international expansion was not limited to economic strategy. Mattei adopted a “Third-Worldist” approach combining direct negotiations with producing states, industrial assistance, and support for independence movements. His goal was to reposition Italy as a key player in the post-decolonization era. One of the most striking examples of Mattei’s Third-Worldism was his support for Algerian independence fighters during the Algerian War. This support was part of a broader strategy to bypass French influence in North Africa and prepare ENI’s entry into an independent Algeria.

In 1958, Mattei first met Saad Dahleb—future Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA)—in Siberia. Soon after, he approached Tayeb Boulahrouf, future GPRA representative in Rome. Mattei even facilitated a meeting between the Algerian nationalist and Italian President Giovanni Gronchi, just before President De Gaulle’s visit to Rome. These early contacts laid the groundwork for a lasting partnership between ENI and Algeria’s future leadership. In 1961, during the Evian negotiations, ENI’s support proved decisive, particularly on the crucial issue of hydrocarbons. Mattei offered the Algerians an alternative to the Seven Sisters’ monopoly, proposing more favorable contracts and guarantees of energy sovereignty. In addition to trade agreements, ENI also provided logistical support to the FLN: fuel supplies, propaganda relays via Radio Algiers, and informal diplomatic channels. This strategy positioned Mattei as a key ally of the future Algerian state.

Nevertheless, Mattei’s influence was not confined to Algeria. His interest in the Sahara extended beyond the Algerian question and reflected a broader vision for Italian presence in North Africa. As early as 1958, he secured a petroleum concession from King Mohammed V of Morocco in Tarfaya (under the “Mattei Formula”), a territory recently ceded to Morocco by Spain. Behind this deal were two strategic objectives: bypass French hegemony and gain access to the Atlantic. Mattei envisioned a new export port that would allow Italy to break free from the “historical stranglehold” of the Mediterranean dominated by France and Britain (via Gibraltar and the Suez Canal). Although this ambitious project was ultimately abandoned, ENI also turned its attention to Tunisia’s oil fields. In 1962, it obtained a concession in El Borma, a site previously exploited by Mobil and Serept but undervalued. By 1964, a major discovery there made Tunisia one of ENI’s primary oil production centers. Mattei also laid the groundwork for Mediterranean gas infrastructure, paving the way for the trans-Mediterranean gas pipeline built in the 1970s.

However, ENI’s maneuvers in the Moroccan and Tunisian Sahara during the late 1950s sometimes raised suspicions within the FLN. Powerless to stop it, some feared that neighboring Maghreb states might try to extend their claims over the Sahara, supported by the Italian company ready to profit from such expansion. Ultimately, far from being guided by ideology alone, Mattei understood that decolonization created economic opportunities for Italy. As he himself put it, he believed in Tunisian independence “not only for moral reasons of human dignity, but also for economic reasons of productivity.” His approach was based on a clear geopolitical stance and an innovative commercial model tailored to a changing global context. Combining diplomacy and commerce, Mattei’s ultimate aim was to bypass the old colonial powers and serve Italy’s geo-economic and geopolitical interests.

“Nazionalisticopopulistica”: Enrico Mattei’s Strategy

Mattei’s actions were part of a broader framework that combined anti-communism, national independence, and economic pragmatism. His objective was to make Italy an autonomous power, capable of navigating between the blocs without fully aligning with either the United States or the USSR. While Mattei openly challenged the major Anglo-Saxon oil companies, he remained fundamentally anti-communist. In his view, ENI’s Third-Worldist strategy was not incompatible with Western interests. On the contrary, his approach aimed to show newly independent nations that the Western bloc was not necessarily imperialist and colonialist, countering Soviet propaganda narratives. This vision—one that could be described as “neo-Atlanticism”—was built on a delicate balance: supporting the sovereign aspirations of emerging countries while keeping them within the Western sphere of influence. Mattei sought to demonstrate that the West could offer a credible alternative to the socialist model, while positioning Italy as a privileged mediator between the United States and Arab countries.

It was in this spirit that Mattei became involved in Algeria, viewing support for the FLN as an opportunity to prove his Third-Worldist credentials. It was not only a strategic blow to France but also a way to prevent an independent Algeria from falling under Soviet influence. ENI thus played a diplomatic role, presenting itself as an acceptable intermediary between the West and the Global South. This logic also applied to Latin America, where Mattei benefited from the support of Dino Grandi, a former foreign minister under Mussolini. Exiled in Brazil, Grandi saw ENI as a tool to combat Latin American communism without inciting “anti-Yankee nationalism,” all in favor of European firms. However, ENI would not establish itself in Brazil until the 1960s, and the “Seven Sisters” systematically opposed its efforts.

At the same time, Mattei did not hesitate to conclude trade agreements with the Soviet Union when they aligned with Italy’s energy interests. In 1957, he signed a crude oil supply deal with the Soviets—a first for a Western bloc country. The agreement stipulated that 60% of the deliveries would be paid for with Italian goods, thereby stimulating the national economy while ensuring a stable oil supply. The results were immediate: between 1958 and 1959, trade between Rome and Moscow surged, benefiting an Italy in the midst of industrial expansion, with growth exceeding 10% per year—the highest rate in Western Europe. ENI did not stop at oil: in 1961, a four-year commercial agreement was signed, covering 12 million tons of Soviet oil over four years, compared to just 800,000 tons in 1959. This Italian-Soviet relationship continued well after Mattei’s death. In 1969, ENI signed a major gas deal with Moscow, involving the sale of 100 billion cubic meters of Soviet natural gas to Italy over twenty years. The agreement marked the USSR’s first major natural gas export to Western Europe and paved the way for increasing energy dependence on Russia. ENI also helped build a pipeline linking Russia to East Germany, in exchange for crude oil deliveries over five years—further cementing Italy’s influence in European energy politics.

Mattei even appeared to be seeking an energy “third way,” inspired by pragmatism and his network of post-World War II contacts. One of the most intriguing figures in his circle was Hjalmar Schacht, former Economy Minister under the Third Reich. After the war, Schacht founded his own bank—Düsseldorfer Außenhandelsbank—and became an advisor to Arab regimes, notably in Egypt under Nasser and in Saudi Arabia. A staunch opponent of Anglo-American dominance, Schacht encouraged Mattei to strengthen cooperation between Italy, West Germany, and oil-producing countries in the Middle East. After Mattei’s death in 1962, Schacht continued this work and helped remove obstacles in Bavaria to allow for the construction of the Genoa-Ingolstadt pipeline in 1966—reinforcing the energy axis between Italy and Germany.

This makes sense, considering that while Mattei had been a resistance fighter during World War II and a member of the Christian Democratic Party (center-right), he retained a form of nationalism imbued with populism, inherited from his early years under the fascist regime. This manifested in his defense of Italy’s national interests against Anglo-Saxon powers and in his promotion of an alternative to the American economic model. In fact, ENI’s energy policy during the 1950s and 1960s could almost be seen as a continuation of Mussolini’s concept of the “proletarian nation,” which positioned dominant nations (the UK, the US) against peoples seeking to assert their economic autonomy. Thus, Mattei’s “third way” was not merely an expression of economic pragmatism but also part of a broader geopolitical continuity, wherein Italy sought to assert a form of independence from the great powers of the 20th century.

Cognitive warfare on the other side of the Mediterranean

ENI’s expansion in the Mediterranean was not based solely on economic strategy. Enrico Mattei quickly understood the need to shape a favorable perception of Italy and its oil company to derive strategic benefits. He adopted a form of cognitive warfare that combined backchannel diplomacy, media influence, and economic intelligence. By influencing local opinion, Mattei aimed to make Italy indispensable in the regional landscape.

Since the Risorgimento, which led to Italy’s unification in 1870, the country had sought to (re)assert itself as a Mediterranean power. But the Italian peninsula remained confined within a maritime space locked down by the United Kingdom. Mattei thus aligned himself with a longstanding geopolitical strategy aimed at breaking this encirclement. Support for Arab nationalist movements was not new—Rome had already maintained parallel diplomatic channels, such as informal envoys who cultivated ties with nationalist circles in Egypt, including those at Al-Azhar. Mattei revived this tradition and integrated it into his own entrepreneurial vision. The oil contract signed with Egypt in 1955 reflects this discreet approach. Negotiated in secret, it was only disclosed to Italian authorities a year later. In this way, Mattei acted as an autonomous player, defining an energy policy that extended beyond the institutional framework of the Italian state. His influence sometimes even exceeded that of official diplomats, to the point that some of his executives considered themselves ambassadors of the “Republic of Metanopoli”—the town Mattei created around ENI’s headquarters. This approach paid off, as seen in Tunisia in the early 1960s, where ENI agents could move about freely and were warmly welcomed simply by stating their identity (unlike the reception given to French representatives).

In 1961, Mattei took things a step further by launching two press agencies in Tunis and Beirut. Officially intended to inform the public about ENI’s activities, these outlets played a much broader role. They acted as unofficial embassies—conducting monitoring operations in oil-producing countries and serving as channels of influence for ENI. Mattei emphasized the need to speak directly to the public in countries where ENI operated. These two press offices served multiple functions: media coverage of ENI’s operations, collection of economic and political intelligence, identification of investment opportunities, and dialogue with local elites. The Beirut office monitored oil markets in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Egypt. It played a key role in tracking developments within OPEC, newly created in 1960, and in managing tensions sparked by the Italian-Soviet energy deal Mattei signed that same year. That agreement, by driving down oil prices, risked alarming Arab producers. ENI had to reassure them that its partnership with the USSR would not undermine their interests. The Tunis office, for its part, covered Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia, with a focus on North African energy developments—particularly Saharan hydrocarbons still under French control. These bureaus were not mere information hubs: they also served to establish ties with Arab leaders and steer their decisions in ENI’s favor. Here, Mattei applied an organizational strategy inspired by the American “staff and line” model, imported in 1957 through the consulting firm Booz Allen & Hamilton. He adopted modern management methods and strategic monitoring practices, training personnel capable of adapting to local political contexts. Far from being anti-American, he drew directly from the methods behind the success of major U.S. corporations to strengthen ENI.

Mattei: a pioneer of Italian economic intelligence?

The press agencies did more than share information—they fueled a structured intelligence network. Each bureau sent daily confidential reports to Rome through secure channels established by Mattei. These memos included local press reviews, analyses of political and economic developments, and, at times, highly sensitive information. Mattei placed great importance on anticipating tensions in countries where ENI was active. For instance, when strikes broke out in 1962 among Moroccan workers at the SAMIR oil refinery in Mohammedia, ENI’s services reacted immediately. Within two weeks, several departments coordinated an in-depth analysis of the social unrest’s impact on Italy’s oil interests in Morocco. This level of responsiveness demonstrated the effectiveness of the intelligence system Mattei had put in place.

ENI’s actions went beyond intelligence gathering. Mattei understood that influence also operated through the media. He therefore decided to subsidize Jeune Afrique, an influential journal among Arab intellectuals and political leaders. By funding the publication, he ensured more favorable editorial coverage—particularly regarding Italy’s oil deals with the USSR. This approach exemplified a well-rooted economic intelligence strategy consistent with Mattei’s long-term vision to maximize ENI’s profits while strengthening its position in the Mediterranean.

ENI thus emerged as a pioneering business model in the context of global economic warfare. Its effectiveness stemmed from the dynamism instilled by Mattei and his inner circle—the “Mattei Boys”—who navigated between geopolitics, business, and geo-economics. Even before World War II, Mattei was a pragmatic entrepreneur who seized opportunities. He adapted well to the autarkic policies of fascist Italy and anticipated just-in-time logistics, later formalized by Japanese engineer Taiichi Ohno at Toyota in the 1950s. Under Mattei’s leadership, ENI played a crucial role in the “Italian economic miracle” (1959–1963), establishing itself in the ultra-strategic hydrocarbons market. The New York Timesdescribed him as the most powerful Italian since Julius Caesar, and some journalists compared him to a modern-day feudal lord—negotiating directly with foreign governments, unaccountable to Italian institutions. Mattei was never a politician in the traditional sense but an economic warrior, pursuing his own strategy with unprecedented freedom. Foreseeing the growing role of economic actors, he once declared: “To me, political parties are like taxis. I take them, they take me where I want to go, and when I get there, I pay and get out.” This quote perfectly encapsulates his pragmatism and entrepreneurial vision, all in service of Italian power.

Ultimately, on October 27, 1962, Enrico Mattei died in the unexplained crash of his plane. The mid-air explosion immediately sparked suspicions of foul play, possibly orchestrated by one of his many enemies—the Seven Sisters, Western intelligence agencies, the Mafia, or the OAS. Though no conclusive evidence was ever found, his suspicious death marked the end of a life spent disrupting the world’s economic powers.