The “Jeune École” and economic warfare

In response to the looming risk of strategic marginalization vis-à-vis Britain and Germany, the “Jeune École” proposed a new naval doctrine for the France of the Third Republic. Rejecting direct confrontation and favoring the disruption of enemy trade flows, several of its theorists developed an asymmetric approach based on exploiting the economic vulnerabilities of major maritime powers. The “Jeune École” thus introduced modern methods in which the economy became a battlefield and commercial flows, strategic targets.

The (Re)birth of a French approach to economic warfare

Emerging in the 1880s, the “Jeune École” presented itself first and foremost as a response to an insurmountable strategic constraint: France’s inability to compete with Britain’s naval superiority.

After the defeat of 1870, political and budgetary priorities focused on rebuilding the army to face the German threat. The navy, relegated to a secondary role, was deprived of the resources needed to build a blue-water fleet capable of standing up to the Royal Navy. Faced with this reality, Vice Admiral Théophile Aube (1826–1890) and Gabriel Charmes (1850–1886) formulated a disruptive doctrine: avoid decisive battles, reject frontal confrontation, and strike the enemy where they are most vulnerable—namely, in their economic dependencies. The nature of conflict shifted; the objective was no longer to destroy military forces, but to weaken the adversary by directly targeting its commercial resources and supply chains.

This line of thinking was grounded in the analysis of major technological transformations of the time. With the rise of the Industrial Revolution, the economies of maritime powers became increasingly dependent on complex supply networks and global value chains. Britain, in particular, saw its prosperity hinge on the security of its maritime routes. It was precisely this vital dependence that the “Jeune École” sought to exploit, capitalizing on technological breakthroughs to offset France’s military inferiority. The torpedo boat became the emblematic weapon of this new strategy: fast, inexpensive, and capable of threatening much larger warships at sea, it was an ideal tool. Alongside it, cruisers—more autonomous and with extended range—were incorporated into a modernized commerce raiding strategy. These units allowed for longer-range strikes, disruption of major shipping routes, and a prolonged sense of economic insecurity across key trading zones.

This approach, built on the direct exploitation of technological innovation, marked a definitive break with the tradition of large fleet engagements. The goal was no longer to match the adversary in raw power, but to implement a strategy of the weak against the strong—one based on dispersed forces, the cumulative effect of small offensive units, and the targeting of the opponent’s economic vulnerabilities. By relying on the multiplication of mobile assets, the “Jeune École” invented a kind of naval techno-guerrilla warfare, where disruptive technology became the key instrument to bypass military superiority and strike directly at the economic foundations of enemy power.

As early as the 17th century, commerce raiding and the use of privateers (such as Jean Bart or Duguay-Trouin) had already been employed by France when state finances could not support a battle fleet or when the main navy was blockaded in port by a superior enemy—as during the Nine Years’ War following the financial crisis of 1693–94. The “Jeune École” revived this old strategy and adapted it to the realities of the industrial age. It was no longer about capturing merchant ships, but about permanently disrupting logistical networks and creating a climate of economic insecurity for the adversary. By targeting maritime routes, striking at raw material supplies, and increasing the cost of transport and insurance, this strategy aimed to weaken the enemy from within by undermining its capacity to sustain a prolonged war effort. The economy thus became a target in its own right, and economic warfare took the form of a systematic assault on the material foundations of enemy power.

Ultimately, Vice Admiral Aube combined Vauban’s “corsair program developed in 1695” with modern weaponry in the age of the Industrial Revolution.

From commerce raiding to total economic warfare

Whereas traditional commerce raiding primarily aimed to harass enemy trade for profit and temporarily disrupt exchanges, the “Jeune École” represented a shift in scale. In the context of an emerging globalization, the objective was no longer merely to disturb but to permanently disorganize—or even destroy—the enemy’s economic flows. This major evolution was based on a careful analysis of the vital dependencies of the great industrial powers, especially Britain. At the time, the British economy relied on an extremely vulnerable global logistics network. Its supply of raw materials and food—essential to the survival of its population and the functioning of its industry—depended on easily identifiable maritime routes.

Richild Grivel (1827–1883), a precursor to the “Jeune École”, argued that British power did not lie in the 20,000 guns of the Royal Navy, but in its 50,000 merchant ships carrying the wealth it depended on. Attacking this trade, he believed, was a form of warfare that France—being a lesser naval power—could wage indefinitely, or at least long enough to trigger the economic collapse of its opponent.

At the beginning of the 20th century, out of 90 million hectoliters of grain consumed, only 18 million were produced domestically. Meanwhile, three million pounds’ worth of foodstuffs were imported weekly via 600 ships, with four-fifths of British resources depending on maritime commerce. It was precisely this vulnerability that the “Jeune École” sought to exploit—systematically and over the long term. The stated goal was to create shortages, disrupt supply chains, drive up freight and insurance costs, and thus gradually weaken the adversary’s war economy. The desired outcome was a domino effect: suffocating the economy to erode public morale and, through economic suffering, break political resolve.

Furthermore, the “Jeune École” maintained that war constituted an existential threat that rendered the constraints of international law obsolete. Its proponents rejected the 1856 Declaration of Paris, arguing that it favored Britain. Their core argument was that war required subordinating international law to necessity, since “everything is not only permitted but legitimate against the enemy.” The experience of recent conflicts—such as the American Civil War (with Confederate cruiser raids on Union commerce) and especially the Franco-Prussian War (where German tactics like the bombardment of Paris and civilian-impacting blockades were cited)—reinforced their belief that future wars would be total wars, deliberately ignoring distinctions between combatants and non-combatants.

The 1898 Fashoda Crisis further exposed the French Navy’s unpreparedness for a conflict with Britain and bolstered the idea that economic warfare was the only viable strategy against a superior power. The “Jeune École” even attracted support from public figures such as Émile Driant (1855–1916), a soldier, writer, and politician. Nonetheless, debates persisted within the Superior Naval Council between advocates of Aube’s theories and traditionalists. Ultimately, the 1904 Entente Cordiale with Britain shifted France’s strategic focus toward Germany. Still, before 1914, British Admiral Percy Scott acknowledged the “Jeune École” relevance, highlighting the UK’s vulnerability to targeted attacks on its food and oil supply lines.

The “Jeune École” vs. Alfred Mahan

The opposition between the strategic thought of the “Jeune École” and that of Alfred Thayer Mahan crystallizes two distinct visions of naval power and the role of economics in warfare.

For Mahan, the theorist of “Sea Power”, maritime supremacy is achieved through the pursuit of decisive battle. The top priority is to destroy the enemy fleet in order to secure total control of the seas. Only after achieving command of the oceans can a maritime power enforce an effective economic blockade and strike at enemy commerce. This sequential and offensive strategy relies on heavy assets: battleships, line fleets, and the concentration of force. In Mahan’s thinking, the economy is secondary—subordinate to military victory at sea. Economic warfare is seen as a consequence of naval dominance, not as a strategic lever in itself.

The “Jeune École” proposed a radically different interpretation. It rejected the logic of decisive battle—too costly and uncertain for a weaker naval power. Instead, it advocated for direct economic warfare targeting commercial flows, without waiting to eliminate the adversary’s fleet. This approach emphasized the immediate exploitation of the enemy’s economic vulnerabilities—striking vital supply lines, multiplying harassment operations, and provoking economic exhaustion even before any major military engagement. It was a strategy of economic attrition through the systematic disruption of enemy logistics and trade networks, made possible by torpedo boats and submarines.

This divide also reflected two different conceptions of strategic time and space. Mahan operated within the long timeframe of classical warfare, where frontal engagement preceded economic consequences. The “Jeune École”, by contrast, favored immediate and relentless economic warfare, where blows to the enemy economy came first—and could even render a military confrontation unnecessary. This approach fully mobilized economic intelligence, requiring a deep understanding of the enemy’s vital dependencies, mapping of trade flows, and identification of critical breakpoints to strike with maximum effect and minimal resources.

World War I would mark the first large-scale application of the “Jeune École” principles. Despite its massive naval buildup, Germany remained unable to challenge the Royal Navy head-on. From 1915 onward, it adopted a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. German U-boats waged a systematic campaign against Allied merchant shipping, seeking to disrupt their logistics and starve the United Kingdom. This strategy—built around the dismantling of the enemy economy—yielded spectacular results in 1917, with massive commercial losses and growing panic in Britain. Yet, as some thinkers had predicted, this unrestricted form of economic warfare had political limits. The indiscriminate attacks on merchant vessels helped provoke the United States’ entry into the war (1917), permanently tipping the balance of power.

Nonetheless, this historical episode confirmed the formidable tactical and strategic effectiveness of economic warfare through control of trade flows—a concept first theorized by the “Jeune École”.

The “Jeune École” in the 21st Century

Though long considered a historical curiosity, the theories of the “Jeune École” have proven remarkably modern and effective in light of 21st-century conflicts. In an era of economic interdependence and vulnerable global supply chains, economic warfare based on the disruption of trade flows finds direct and practical application.

The case of the Houthis in the Red Sea provides a striking illustration of the contemporary revival of this strategy. Deprived of conventional naval means, these non-state actors act as proxies for Iran, which exploits their position along the Bab el-Mandeb Strait to wage economic warfare against Western countries. Using maritime drones, ballistic missiles, and low-cost suicide boats, the Houthis impose a constant threat on international shipping routes. Around 15% of global maritime trade passes through the Red Sea, including nearly 40% of trade between Asia and Europe. During the Houthi attacks, major shipping companies were at times forced to reroute around Africa—significantly extending transit times, increasing transport costs (by up to 300% in early 2024), and disrupting European supply chains. This modern form of naval techno-guerrilla warfare directly mirrors the principles of the “Jeune École”: targeting economic vulnerabilities with asymmetric means and imposing disproportionate costs to economically “bleed” one’s adversaries.

Similarly, the conflict in Ukraine reveals a parallel dynamic, both on land and at sea. Confronted with Russia’s conventional military superiority, Ukraine has made massive and innovative use of aerial and maritime drones to wage economic attrition warfare. These drones—often produced cheaply using civilian technologies—target military production capacities, logistical infrastructure, and Russian warships in the Black Sea. By 2024, Ukraine had destroyed 40% of Russia’s naval tonnage in the Black Sea through asymmetric warfare combining USVs (uncrewed surface vehicles) and cruise missiles. One striking example: the destruction of a multi-million-dollar warship by a $250,000 USV. Through such attacks, Ukraine seeks to disrupt Russia’s war economy, impose enormous defense expenditures, and inflict strategic losses—without deploying heavy conventional assets. This ability to destabilize the enemy’s economy through technological innovation aligns directly with the “Jeune École” approach: using new technologies to strike at economic, logistical, and psychological pressure points at minimal cost.

These contemporary examples highlight the current strength of indirect economic warfare based on the disruption of global trade flows. Today’s strategies are built on technological connectivity and the networking capabilities of decentralized units. In its time, the “Jeune École” also advocated for networking naval forces—using telegraphs and signal stations—and embraced a scientific approach to warfare. By emphasizing the multiplication and coordination of small offensive units, it already anticipated a decentralized, reactive form of warfare capable of striking critical nodes of the global economy at any moment.

In light of this reality, it is now necessary to reconcile the two major strategic traditions: Mahanian thought and the “Jeune École”. In an environment marked by hybrid warfare, diffuse threats, and access-denial strategies, classical naval confrontation is no longer sufficient. Command of the seas is no longer achieved solely through force concentration and decisive battle, but also through the ability to secure—or disrupt—economic flows in both wartime and peacetime. This resurgence of economic warfare logic calls for the full integration of the “Jeune École” lessons into contemporary strategy. More than ever, the control of flows and the mastery of economic intelligence have become essential tools in the global balance of power.